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Abstract
We extend previous models of duopolies by introducing regions. This
analysis highlights how incentives to conduct process R&D are aﬀected by
increasing regional distance, and the eﬀect that agglomeration (in terms
of population) has on two ﬁrms producing a high- and low-quality good
respectively. We ﬁnd that, under reasonable assumptions, an increase in
transport costs (regional distance), raises the incentive to conduct process
R&D for the high-quality good, while the reverse is true for the low-quality
good. Transport costs generally lower production. We interpret this re-
sult to arise because the high-quality good can more easily regain (some)
market output, due to its high quality, which gives an impetus for pro-
cess R&D. The second result is that an increase in agglomeration in the
high-quality region, lowers the incentive to conduct process R&D for the
high-quality good, while the opposite is true for the low-quality good.
This seems consistent with a view of spatial product life-cycles where pro-
cess R&D is increasingly moved to ’peripheral’ regions as agglomerative
tendencies continue in high-quality output regions.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper extends previous work on duopoly models with price and research
decisions, by introducing a regional dimension. These models were pioneered by
authors Mussa and Rosen (1978); Shaked and Sutton (1982). It was extended
by Bonanno and Haworth (1998) who examined the incentives for conducting
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1process R&D and product R&D under Bertrand and Cournot duopoly respec-
tively, where the two ﬁrms produced high and low quality goods respectively.
Bertrand duopoly is usually claimed to depict a situation of more intense com-
petition, because ﬁrms choose prices, and generally lead to higher output. That
paper found that more process innovations (process R&D) were optimally un-
dertaken under Cournot competition than Bertrand competition. Furthermore,
when comparing the behaviour of the high-quality good to that of the low-
quality good, it was found that whenever there is a diﬀerence, the high-quality
producer was more likely to conduct process R&D. The reverse result held for
the low-quality good.
We alter the model by Bonanno and Haworth (1998) to include regional
distance, which is simply proxied by a unit transport cost inferred on the con-
sumers. To make the analysis tractable, we have homogenous unit costs of
production, where our predecessors instead had higher unit costs for the high-
quality good. We analyse Bertrand-competition and examine the eﬀects that
an increase in distance between regions has on the incentive to conduct process
R&D. We also examine what eﬀect agglomerations have on the incentive to
innovate, by increasing the share of the population in the high-quality region.
This is intended to capture dynamic aspects of the product-life cycle, where
population becomes more concentrated.
2 The Model
There are two regions, each with one ﬁrm producing a good. Region H (high)
produces the high quality good and region L (low) the low quality good. The
quality level of the low quality good is set at 1. We have two types of con-
sumers, one in each region. Each consumer has an income E that can be spent
consuming only one unit of one good. If it is used for consumption, the utility
is equal to E − p − t + θk,w h e r ep is the good’s price, k its quality and θ the
taste parameter. Lower values of θ reﬂect a preference of variety goods. For
consumers with θ>θ ∗,w h e r eθ∗ ∈ (0,1) is some threshold value, demand is
positive. If there is no consumption the utility is E. t are ﬁxed per unit trans-
port costs, which is zero if the good is produced in the home region but larger
than zero if produced in the other region. This parameter constitutes the main
diﬀerence over models of previous authors (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Bonanno
and Haworth, 1998). Consumers taste parameters, θ, are uniformly distributed
over the intervall (0,1]. Assume intially, that there are N consumers in each
region. This implies that for a value x ∈ (0,1] there will be 2xN consumers of
preference x or lower.
We now derive the demand function in each region.
2.1 Demand
Consider consumption of the low quality good. For which θ is the consumer
indiﬀerent between consuming it and not consuming at all? This happens when
2E = E − pL + θ (1)
Implying that θ
L
0 = pL (the superscript denoting the region). Furthermore we
can deﬁne the level θ f o rw h i c hac o n s u m e ri si n d i ﬀerent between purchasing
the low quality good and the high quality good.






For Region H, similar to the above we write
E = E − pL − t + θ (3)
Implying θ
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Now, total demand for the low quality good is the sum of the number of
consumers falling within the range θ0 <θ<θ 1 for both regions. θ1 <θ<1 is
the range of the parameter for which consumers prefer the high quality good.
This implies the demand functions DL and DH for each type of good respectively
DH =( 1 − θ
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2.2 Production and equilibria
We assume a constant returns to scale production function. Costs are given by
Ci = cqi (7)
where c is the per unit cost (assumed to be the same for both ﬁrms) and
qi production. We also assume that demand is positive when price equals cost,
that prices and quantities are always positive and proﬁts ≥ 0.
The proﬁt conditions are for the goods are in the Bertrand-Nash competitive
situation:
ΠH(pH,p L)=( pH − c)
µ




ΠL(pH,p L)=( pL − c)
µ












(c +2 ckH + t − tkH + kH − 1)
(4kH − 1)
(9)
Quantities produced are then
qH =
(4kH − 2c − t)N
(4kH − 1)
qL =
(1 − 2c − t)kHN
2(4kH − 1)
(10)
The last expression requires 2c + t<1 for positive production. Equilibrium
proﬁt levels are
πH(pH,p L)=
(2c + t − 4kH)








2kH (2c + t − 1)




L (kH − 1)
N
What happens with prices, quantities and proﬁts if the regions were more
distant? It can easily be seen that prices, quantities and proﬁts are all lowered
since kH > 1, and we assume that production and proﬁts are positive before
increasing t.
2.3 Process innovations
We now introduce process innovations which are deﬁned as reductions in unit
cost. This is done by a two-stage procedure similar to D’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988). The second stage maximizes proﬁts conditional on research investments
of both ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst stage research is done. A research investment reduces
unit cost of production by r. The cost of research is cr = β r
2
2 with β>0.T h i s
functional form is chosen to reﬂect diminishing returns of R&D. The exact value
of β determines how fast diminishing returns sets in. We solve the problem by
ﬁrst considering the second stage, where research investments are treated as
given. The proﬁt equations are modiﬁed to
˜ ΠH =( pH − c + rH)
µ








˜ ΠL =( pL − c + rL)
µ
























H − 4kH + t − tkH +2 c − 2ckH +4 kHrH − 2kHrL − 2rH
¢
N
(4kH − 1)(kH − 1)
˜ qL =
2(2c − 2ckH + t − tkH + kH − rH − rL +2 kHrL − 1)kHN
(4kH − 1)(kH − 1)
and the equilibrium proﬁtl e v e l s
˜ πH(pH,p L)=
¡











2kHN (rH − t − kH − 2c + rL +2 ckH + tkH − 2kHrL +1 )
2
(4kH − 1)






The ﬁrst stage maximization problem is then to choose research to maximize
the above proﬁt levels. The equilibrium research values ˜ rH and ˜ rL for are quite
long and are therefore put in the Appendix. It is there shown that for very
reasonable assumptions about kH,β and N, the incentive eﬀect of an increase
in t on optimal process R&D is more positive for the high-quality good than
the low-quality good. We interpret this as the following. As distance increases
between regions, it becomes more diﬃcult to sell goods across regions. However,
this is more likely to be countered with higher process R&D in the high-quality
region, due to the easier selling-capability of the higher-quality good.
2.4 The eﬀects of population agglomeration
From a spatial product life cycle perspective, it is commonly found that goods
are developed in larger, urban regions, and then, as they mature, production
is typically transferred to smaller ones (Karlsson, 1999; Duranton and Puga,
2001).1 Hence, it should be interesting to see what eﬀect changing sizes of re-
gions have on the incentive for process innovation. We analyse this by letting
1The original observation (Vernon, 1966) concerns the observation that production moves
from developed to less developed countries.
5the host region for the high-quality good have more than half of the total pop-
ulation and see what eﬀect an increase in its share have on the incentive to
innovate. Rewriting the population sizes gives us
NH = α2N
NL =( 1− α)2N , 1/2 <α<1 (17)
The demand equations become
DH =( 1− θ
L
1 )(1 − α)2N +( 1− θ
H
1 )α2N =




















2(pH − kHpL − tα + t − tαkH)N
(kH − 1)
The proﬁt equations are
¯ ΠH =( pH − c + rH)
µ







¯ ΠL =( pL − c + rL)
µ








Solving of the second stage Bertrand-Nash game gives us
¯ pH =
¡












t − tα + c − 2kH − rH − ckH − 2tkH +3 tαkH +2 kHrH − kHrL +2 k2
H
¢
(4kH − 1)(kH − 1)
(21)
¯ qL =
2kHN (2c + t + kH − rH − rL − 2ckH − 2tαkH +2 kHrL − 1)















2N2kH (rH − t − kH − 2c + rL +2 ckH +2 tαkH − 2kHrL +1 )
2
(4kH − 1)






Solving of the ﬁrst stage gives expressions for optimal process R&D showed in
the appendix. The numerical results, using the same numerical parameter values
as in the previous example, suggest that optimal process R&D is negatively
aﬀected by an increase in the regional size of the high-quality region, while the
increase in size of the high-quality region has a positive eﬀect on the optimal
process R&D size in the low-quality region.
3 Discussion
Our results seem to suggest that as agglomeration forces become more pro-
nounced, process R&D is increasingly moved to ’peripheral’ regions. This seems
consistent with a view of spatial product life-cycles where process R&D is in-
creasingly moved to ’peripheral’ regions as agglomerative tendencies continue
in high-quality output regions. We plan to extend this paper to study the role
for product R&D in the two regions, where agglomeration becomes more pro-
nounced. Another extension would be to conduct a comparative study of the
Cournot and Bertrand situations respectively. In a longer perspective other
competitive forms could naturally be studied as well.
A Optimal Process R&D with equal-sized re-
gions
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4N − 4Nc− 2Nt+ β
−2cβ − tβ +8 NckH +4 NtkH











We can ﬁrst note that the denominator is the same for both expressions. To
evaluate the eﬀect of an increase in t, we have to make additional, informal,
assumptions regarding the relationship between N and β. Suppose that the
number of citizens in the economy are counted in (at least) the thousands. Sec-
ondly, given the fact that we have assumed kH >k L =1 , it seems reasonable to
think that β should be of a reasonably similar order of magnitude. Furthermore,
it doesn’t seem reasonable to assume a quality diﬀerence higher than 4 times.
Inserting N = 1000β,kH =4and evaluating the denominator, we ﬁnd that it
is clearly larger than zero. This result would hold also with much less strict
assumptions (kH and/or N could be much smaller). Therefore, we assume that
in what follows the denominator is positive. The eﬀect of an increase in t can
be shown by comparing the magnitude of the derivatives of the numerators. For
the eﬀect of an increase in t to have a larger eﬀect on ˜ rH than ˜ rL we require
that d˜ rH
dt > d˜ rL
dt . Given the assumption about the denominator, this is true if
2Nβ− 14NβkH +8 N2kH +2 8 Nβk2
H − 16Nβk3
H − 32N2k2
H +3 2 N2k3
H >
4NβkH +8 N2kH − 28Nβk2
H +5 6 Nβk3
H − 32Nβk4
H − 32N2k2
H +3 2 N2k3
H
It can easily be shown that this is true if and only if kH > 1 which we have
already assumed from the outset. We therefore conclude, that given reasonable
assumptions of the parameter values, there is a larger incentive to conduct
process R&D for ﬁrm H as the distance between the regions increases.
8B Optimal Process R&D with diﬀerent sizes of
regions
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+10cβkH +4 tβkH +2 tαβkH − 16N2kH
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9We ﬁnd that the denominator is the same for both expressions. Analysing
these using the sensible parameter values as in the former Appendix, the denom-
inator is positive. The numerator is negative for the drH
dα case. This suggests
that process R&D is negatively aﬀected by increases in population in the high
quality region. The numerator is positive in the low quality region suggesting
t h eo p p o s i t er e s u l t .
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